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The Cockpit Culture and the Flight Training Environment in South Asia
Khalid Mehmood
Daastan Publishing 2023
First Published in Pakistan by Daastan PVT LTD
House # A-41, Madni Street, Lala Rukh, Wah Cantt, Punjab 47040
Text copyrights © Khalid Mehmood
Book Design copyright © Khalid Mehmood
Edited by: Mariam Rizvi
The moral rights of the writer, the illustrator, and the editor have been asserted.
All rights reserved
This book or any portion thereof may not be reproduced or distributed in any manner whatsoever without the express written permission of the publisher, except for the use of brief quotations in a book review.
ISBN 978-969-696-917-4
To Ayra and Sara
PREFACE
Aviation is a dynamic industry. In our rapidly modernizing world, with innovations and inventions occurring daily, there is a continuous over-influx of new trends, machines, technologies, procedures, avionics, and navigation aids. This necessitates a perpetual cycle of aircrew induction, training, retraining, and retirement. To meet the ever-changing demands of commercial flying, an effective training and checking mechanism is integral to any aviation entity.
All countries have their aircrew training and checking mechanisms, and they don’t differ radically from one another. Training is meant to bring the trainee up to the required level of skill and proficiency and checking is meant to ensure that the desired minimum standards have been achieved.
Barring minor exceptions, the training methodology adopted is again more or less the same. Everywhere, people are ground-schooled, trained for a specified number of hours on the simulators followed by training on the aircraft for some hours. In the end, the trainee is checked out by a qualified examiner.
If there is no big difference, then why is it that in some countries, the trainees detest and fear the training while in others they simply look forward to it and enjoy it? The answer lies in the cockpit culture and environment in which the training is carried out.
In over four decades of flying in different parts of the world where I have both imparted as well as received training and flown with individuals from all over the globe, I have come to realize that the cockpit culture and the training cum checking environment prevalent in Pakistan is, to put it mildly, far from perfect. I am pretty certain that other countries in the region are not far behind. That makes it a typical South Asian issue. We all know this unfriendly and toxic culture is a legacy of the master-slave mentality left behind by the British but sadly, we can’t absolve ourselves of the responsibility for not having done anything to address the issue even after the passage of three-quarters of a century.
Several professionals have conducted studies and research on ergonomics and human factors in aviation. Having written at length about the issues related to the simulator and line training, they have adequately covered different aspects very thoroughly. Since most of such authors belong to Western countries, their focus was naturally restricted to the issues faced in their region. In South Asia, several serious issues are embedded in our unique cultural and social setup that are not found elsewhere in the world. The Western authors couldn’t possibly have written about these issues since they were not privy to the problems faced by the South Asian aviation community.
I appreciate the efforts made by the ICAO and many member countries in addressing the training and evaluation issues faced by the commercial aviation industry. Competency Based Training and Assessment (CBTA) and Evidence Based Training (EBT) are indeed bold initiatives in the right direction. All pilots regardless of their geographic location on the globe must be subject indiscriminately to the same standards of skill and competency because the aircraft they are flying are the same anywhere in the world. Since human lives matter equally on all continents, all of them should be able to achieve and demonstrate the same level of proficiency in flying the aircraft.
ICAO being a neutral body, regulates safety equally in all countries without regard to cultural differences. However, we need to cognize that in South Asia, the society is so strongly dominated by rigid cultural values that the influence seeps into every facet of daily life. The impact is felt in the national, professional, and organizational cultures. Regional culture in South Asia plays an overbearing and predominant role in influencing the cockpit atmosphere and simulator training environment. It can create impediments and barriers that negatively impact effective training. Many such influences, typical to the South Asian region, remain unbeknownst to the West.
High power distance, poor CRM, undue stress, a toxic cockpit environment, and the consequent high accident rates were too significant and costly concerns to be allowed to prevail unmitigated. I felt a dire need to highlight these issues and suggest remedial measures to ‘detoxify’ our training atmosphere. I started writing a short article and before I knew it, it had expanded into a paper. Ideas, stories, theories, and research kept pouring in and the paper soon morphed into the book that you are now reading. I have shared personal experiences, events, anecdotes, and knowledge based on my lifelong association with the industry. Wherever I have talked about a typical behavior or attitude, it is certainly not representative of the entire lot of professionals involved. There are always exceptions to the norm, but to highlight the trait of the majority, generalization had to be resorted to extensively in this discourse.
The book uses the masculine form solely for the ease of reading but refers to men, women, and the gender diverse.
In this book, you’ll find a lot of critique on our current training and checking system, but it has been done in good faith with a constructive mindset. We can’t possibly better ourselves in any field if we are not aware of our flaws.
South Asia as a region has no dearth of enterprising and talented professionals who have the potential to bring about a positive change in our socio-cultural thinking and behavior. All that is needed is a bit of mentoring and a platform to channelize that energy. The onus of providing that lies on the local aviation authorities of the region.
I am cognizant that the results of my solitary groundbreaking efforts won’t be visible overnight; it is a long-drawn war against ill-placed values and notions that continue to plague our culture, often with disastrous consequences. It’s not a single man’s job; all of us who relate to aviation in any way are required to make a concerted effort to bring about a much-needed and long-overdue cultural reformation. Just like any radical change, it is going to be a slow, arduous, and painstaking process for which I have just sown the seeds. We know that neither does a bud blossom into a flower overnight nor does a tree bear fruit the next day. But then, every journey starts with a small first step and I have just taken mine. Even if it amounts to a tiny drop in the ocean, I am contented with having done my bit. I pray that others join me in this journey and that it leads us to a better place; a place where cockpits glow with serene, smiling faces and simulators gleam with tranquil, beaming souls. Aameen.
May Allah bless us all.
Khalidguru
Karachi, Pakistan
March 2023
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Cockpit Culture and Safety.
II. Line Captain/First Officer Relationship.
III. Instructors/Examiners (SFIs/SFEs/TRIs/TREs)
IV. Initiative.
VI. Don’t Embarrass.
X. Evasion/Avoidance Maneuvers.
Stall and Stick Pusher Training.
XI. Automation.
XV. Integrating Technical and Non-Technical Training.
XVIII. The Role of the Inspector
I.
COCKPIT CULTURE AND SAFETY
Most South Asian cultures are inherently hierarchical in nature. In the region, juniors are expected to be unconditionally deferential toward their superiors. This cultural trait creates a high-power distance between two people in the cockpit. It can have a significant bearing on the behavior of the pilots during a flight and its effect becomes more pronounced in case of an onboard emergency. First officers are reluctant to question a captain even if he is making a gross error of judgment. Modern aircraft are designed to be flown by a team of two pilots who enjoy equal status as human beings. This culturally induced high-power distance where one pilot is hesitant to point out omissions or show disagreement with the other one merely because of his rank can be potentially detrimental to flight safety. Wary that it might affect their relationships with peers and seniors, South Asian pilots are generally hesitant to report an unsafe condition. They also feel uncomfortable voicing their opinion as it is likely to disturb the group harmony. A superior expects unquestioned authority and blind obedience because of his higher hierarchical standing.
The idea of having two pilots in the cockpit is based on the need for flight safety in commercial aviation. They should be able to monitor each other’s performance and if one of them feels that safety is being compromised, they must point out errors and challenge decisions regardless of rank or seniority. When commercial flying started, an FO showing dissent to a captain’s decision was considered behaving disrespectfully. During the early 50’s, in one of the major American carriers, the FOs were categorically forbidden to correct a captain’s mistakes. CRM brought about a fundamental change in these concepts. FOs are now not just expected but actively urged to challenge the captain’s decisions and point out discrepancies if in their opinion the safety of the flight is being endangered. Statistics tell us that many serious accidents could have been averted had the FOs come forward and questioned the captain’s decision instead of staying quiet and acting like silent spectators. Various studies found out that the FOs were generally cagey about voicing their opinion as they feared a social backlash. Some of them thought it would result in retaliation and damage their relationship with the captain being challenged. Others feared their speaking up might be viewed negatively. FOs from high power distance regions were found to be less likely to speak up to avoid risking being labeled arrogant and disrespectful. The onus of this falls on the prevalent hierarchical cockpit culture and is more pronounced in high power distance societies like South Asia.
Cultural constraints contribute to airplane accidents and incidents. High power distance cockpit culture was blamed for the Korean Air crash in 1997 when the captain decided to pursue the landing against the FO’s advice. The crash of Avianca Flight 52 in 1990 was attributed to ineffective and lacking communication between the pilots and ground controllers because of cockpit culture. The crash of Airblue Flight 202 in 2010 was attributed to the very high power distance in the cockpit. The captain's arrogant attitude during the entire flight caused the first officer to lose his self-esteem, making him less likely to speak up about the captain's mistakes and effectively ceased any meaningful CRM due to the toxic work environment.
The crash of Bhoja Air Flight 213 in 2012 due to bad weather is another classic case where culture contributed to the accident. The FO had been a student of the captain at the Air Force Academy and saw him as a father figure. He had been frequently paired with the captain in their previous company and was looked after by the captain. The two eventually became too comfortable with each other, preventing the FO from calling out the captain's mistakes.
The investigation described the cockpit situation as being chaotic after encountering the wind shear. Following the second downdraft, the CRM totally collapsed. The FO was particularly noted for being "ignorant" and unhelpful to the unfolding situation. In several instances, he could be heard advising the captain instead of taking over control from him. According to the investigators, his actions which contributed to the crash were mainly caused by the relationship between him and the captain.
II.
LINE CAPTAIN/FIRST OFFICER RELATIONSHIP
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